Some facts about the housing crash
Oct 11th, 2008 by Rick Saenz
I’m far from having a solid understanding of the current economic crisis, but I’ve been closely watching it for the past two years when it began to manifest itself in the housing crash, and I think at this point there are quite a few important facts about housing that are by now uncontroversial. I’ll list them here with minimal interpretation, saying only that I think the housing crash is still at the center of the overall crisis.
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In the past ten years many, many people have bought homes which by any traditional standard were far more expensive than their incomes and savings could justify.
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Buyers bought these homes with mortgages that were far larger than they could reasonably expect to repay.
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Buyers were able to take out mortgages larger than they could repay because:
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Lenders relaxed the traditional requirement of a 20% down payment from the borrower, accepting 10% or 5% or sometimes nothing at all.
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Lenders offered mortgages with adjustable interest rates (ARMs) that were initially low but would rise later, making the loan more affordable up front.
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Lenders offered mortgages where in the beginning the borrower could choose to pay only the interest on the loan, or even less (Option ARMs), meaning that the principal would stay the same or even grow over time, but further reducing the payments made early on.
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Lenders often did not require documentation proving that the borrower had sufficient income and savings to pay off the mortgage (stated income or “liar’s” loans).
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Buyers were encouraged to take out mortgages larger than they could repay because of intermediaries (real estate agents and mortgage brokers) who stood to make good money when the transaction took place and were at no risk if the buyer later defaulted.
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Because of these lax lending practices, buyers were able to arrange for mortgages whose initially low payments they could barely manage to pay, and whose future larger payments were far beyond their ability to pay.
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Buyers were willing to take out mortgages larger than they could repay because they did not intend to repay them, but planned to sell them at a profit before repayment became too difficult.
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Because buyers were able to obtain so much leverage (i.e. ability to borrow with respect to their income), demand for houses grew and housing prices rose far higher than could be justified by average income in an area; at the peak houses cost about twice as much nationally as average income could justify, in some areas three times as much.
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Because of the demand, far too many houses were built that were far too large, at least compared against the traditional needs of the population.
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Because of the demand, the housing industry became an important component of the economy. Between 2000 and 2007, half of the new jobs created were connected to the housing market.
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As prices rose, owners began to add further to their debt by borrowing against the increased value of their home (home equity loans, or second mortgages).
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Many owners ended up with zero or even negative equity in their home (i.e. their loans were equal to or greater than the value of the home), either by never having paid a down payment or by taking out second mortgages.
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As mortgages began to age, payments began to rise and borrowers found themselves needing to sell because they could no longer pay them. At the same time housing prices began to drop.
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As housing prices began to drop, many owners found themselves “underwater,” owing more on the home than the home was worth. To sell their house, these folks would have to bring a check to the closing to pay off what they owed even after selling it. A recent report claims that 16% of all mortgage holders in the U.S. are currently underwater.
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As housing prices began to drop, the market began to freeze up because buyers were mentally unable to accept (or financially unable to handle) selling for less than they had thought the house was worth.
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As the market froze, new housing construction also ground to a halt, and jobs connected with housing began to disappear.
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Many first mortgages in the U.S. are what are called “non-recourse” loans, that is, if the borrower defaults on the loan then the lender agrees to take possession of the house in lieu of further payments. This is unlike, say, a car loan, where if the borrower defaults the lender can repossess the car, sell it, and then require that the borrower pay the difference between the loan balance and what the car sold for.
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When a borrower defaults, first mortgages holders are first in line for any proceeds from the sale of a foreclosed house, followed by second mortgage holders. However, second mortgage holders must agree to the sale. Many second mortgage holders are reluctant to agree to the sale of a house whose price has dropped, because there is little or no money left for them after the first mortgage holder has taken its share.
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Buyers have become increasingly willing to “walk away” from their mortgages, turning the keys over to the lender; default has become socially acceptable, the effects on one’s credit record are erased after seven years, and many buyers feel that lenders bear much of the blame for enticing them into a bad deal.
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Increasing default levels have made the mortgages owned by banks increasingly worthless. One early event in the credit crisis came in June 2007, when two Bear Stearns hedge funds that had heavily invested in subprime mortgages were forced to sell them; it turned out that the better fund was able to sell them for nine cents on the dollar, while the other fund discovered that their mortgages were worth nothing at all.
Strangely enough, all these things were true by mid-2007 and there has been nothing interesting to add to the list since then. All that has happened since is that these trends have picked up speed and made themselves increasingly felt. Housing prices continue to drop. Borrowers continue to default. Buyers are increasingly scarce. Mortgage pools held by banks continue to lose value. Housing-related businesses continue to lose sales.
I think what I’ve written so far is widely acknowledged to be true. What follows is speculation, but I think it is fairly well grounded in the facts:
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Borrowers will continue to default in growing numbers for many years. This is in large part because the riskiest mortgages (Option ARMs) are just beginning to have their payments reset to higher amounts, a process that will continue for at least three years. Remember, these are the loans where grossly exaggerating one’s income was a common thing, and the buyer had the option of paying a payment that didn’t even cover the interest; these folks will now have to pay enough to cover interest and principal, at a new higher interest rate based on LIBOR, which is sky-high at the moment.
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Because of increasing defaults, banks will fail in greater numbers and the survivors will continue to be unable to lend, not because the credit market is mysteriously “frozen” but because they are insolvent, i.e. broke. Their mortgage assets will become ever more worthless.
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Housing prices will continue to drop for a long while, and will not rise for a very long while. One calculation claims that the relationships between housing prices and household income during the 20th century was steady and predictable until the mid-90s when all this nonsense began. If we take the steady trend that existed and apply it to current income levels, national housing prices at their peak were 2x what they should be, 3x in areas like California and Florida. A $600,000 California home will have to drop to $200,000 before things are normal again.
Finally, I think there is nothing that can be done to fix these problems:
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Housing prices rose because people were willing to pay far more than a house was truly worth, because they thought that other people down the road would be willing to buy their house for far, far more than it was truly worth. Once that trend disintegrated, those people found themselves in possession of a financial obligation all out of proportion to the worth of what they had purchased. There is no way to re-interest buyers in buying those houses at inflated prices.
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Borrowers went to extremes to be able to afford their loans, exaggerating their income, arranging for artificially low initial interest rates and artificially low initial payments that would rise greatly in just a few years. They took out loans far beyond their ability to repay because they expected never to have to repay them; they did not buy a $600,000 house in order to have a $600,000 house, but in order to sell that house at a profit later on. No modification of the loan terms will make that buyer want to pay the rest of the $600,000 plus interest for a house that is now worth $200,000. The law will not force them to fulfill that obligation, and I doubt that a sense of honor will. So those loans will be defaulted in large numbers.
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